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According to the traditional view, Aristotle considered ethics to be an imprecise discipline whose methods of reasoning do not conform to the rigid standards of science laid out in the Analytics. As such, the orthodoxy holds, moral phenomena cannot be investigated scientifically according to the norms of Aristotle’s own philosophy of science. There is an emerging line of thought in the literature on Aristotle’s ethics aimed at challenging this traditional interpretation (e.g. Reeve 1992, Anagnostopoulos 1994, Winter 1997, Irwin 2000, Natali 2007). Even if Aristotle believed that moral phenomena could not be the subject of a deductive science, that is not enough to show that his ethical treatises are altogether unscientific. For there is more to Aristotle’s philosophy of science than the theory of demonstration; for example, the second book of the Posterior Analytics (APo.) contains a rich discussion of scientific inquiry along with a theory for constructing scientific definitions. The aim of this volume is to consolidate emerging research on Aristotle’s philosophy of science and his moral philosophy in an attempt to explore the relationship between the two areas. We feel that the intersections between Aristotle’s science and ethics provide a fruitful, yet underdeveloped, area for study.
The proposed volume will approach the theme from the perspective of ethics. The central question is: To what extent do Aristotle’s ethical treatises make use of the concepts, methods and practices that the Analytics and other works characterizes as ‘scientific’? There are two ways of framing the issue, which will help to organize the papers in this volume. The first set of papers approach the theme by focusing on the practical side of ethics concerned with action. Do the Analytics help shed light on the way Aristotle understands practical decision making? For example, are there important affinities between practical wisdom (phronesis) and scientific knowledge (epistêmê)? Does Aristotle’s theory of demonstration provide a useful model for thinking about deliberation? The other set of papers approach the question by focusing on moral theory itself. Does Aristotle think of the domain of moral phenomena (happiness, virtue, justice, etc.) as something that can be investigated scientifically? Is the subject matter of ethics tractable by Aristotle’s scientific method? Further, to what extent do the ethical treatises themselves employ the concepts and methods developed for the theoretical sciences? One example will help illustrate the relevance of Aristotle’s philosophy of science to his ethics.
According to David Charles, APo. II develops a method for arriving at scientific definitions, which is divided into three stages:
“Stage 1: This stage is achieved when one knows an account of what a name or another name-like expression signifies (…93b30-2). 
Stage 2: This stage is achieved when one knows that what is signified by a name or name-like expression exists (…93b32).
Stage 3: This stage is achieved when one knows the essence of the object/kind signified by a name or name-like expression (…93b32-3).”​[1]​
In NE V 1 Aristotle tells us that we must define (dioristeon) the concepts of justice and injustice (1130b22). The subsequent discussion proceeds exactly as we should expect if Aristotle were following the Analytics model for investigating natural kinds: it begins from a preliminary account of what the names “justice” and “injustice” signify (1128b8-12), then moves on to investigate whether or not those kinds exist (1130a14-17), and then finally turns to the essence of justice and injustice which will explain why they exhibit the features specified in the initial account (1130a33-b8).
We expect that the proposed volume to yield many important results. In the first place, showing that there are close links between the way Aristotle investigates moral phenomena in the Ethics and the program outlined in the scientific works has the potential to open up new and innovative directions of research into Aristotle’s moral philosophy. As a parallel one could point to the explosion of new research into Aristotle’s biology once it was shown to be consistent with the ideals of his philosophy of science. Prior to this, the prevailing attitude was that for Aristotle biology was an imprecise discipline whose methods do not conform to the rigid standards of science laid out in the Analytics. In the second place, we do not expect to find that the gap between science and ethics can be completely bridged and hence we have included certain papers aimed at making those differences more precise. Ethics, for Aristotle, can never be fully assimilated to a model of scientific inquiry, no matter how plastic its norms are seen to be. Understanding why will help shed new light on Aristotle’s views about the limits of science. In each case, the results of this volume promise to make a significant contribution to advancing our understanding of the epistemological, metaphysical, and psychological foundations of Aristotle’s Ethics.
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Introduction. 			“Mind the Gap”				
Author: Devin Henry and Karen Nielsen (University of Western Ontario)
Synopsis: The introduction will set up the central issue by examining the traditional obstacles to thinking of Aristotle’s ethics through the lens of his philosophy of science. (Descriptions of the individual papers will be done in the introductions for each section.)
According to the traditional reading of Aristotle’s Ethics, moral phenomena exhibit two features that make them intractable to scientific investigation. First, they are variable and capable of being otherwise, so that general truths about them hold only for the most part (NE I.3, 1094b13-28; III.3, 1112b7-12; VI.5, 1140a32-b7). And Aristotle claims that there cannot be scientific knowledge of things that hold only for the most part (NE VI.5, 1140a32-b7; APo. I.33). Second, they are imprecise so that our accounts about them should be stated only roughly and in broad outline (1094b13-28; 1104a1-8; 1126a32-b4; 1098a20-35). By contrast, the Analytics takes precision to be among the hallmarks of scientific knowledge. From this scholars have concluded that Aristotle’s ethical treatises are importantly non-scientific, dealing with the contingent and particular and employing methods of reasoning that do not conform to the norms of his philosophy of science. One strategy for removing these obstacles (explored in detail by the papers in Section §IV) is to recognize that these same features are exhibited by the objects of natural science. And yet this does not prevent them from being investigated scientifically.
The other main objection to be addressed here is the fact that Aristotle claims, on several occasions, that ethics is a practical discipline and that the aim of a practical discipline is action not contemplation (NE I 3, 1095a5; X 9, 1179b1; EE I 5, 1216b21 ff.). This obstacle is removed by understanding the relation Aristotle sees between theory and practice. Aristotle does not claim that ethics excludes a theoretical component; rather, he claims that the ultimate goal of theory must be action (MM I.34, 1197a32-7, EE 1.6).
Since the proposed volume attempts to bring together research from two separate areas of Aristotelian scholarship, the introduction will also include a general discussion aimed at familiarizing the reader with the basic themes from each of the separate areas. The section on Aristotle’s ethics will cover such topics as the role of happiness, moral and intellectual virtues, the human good, its constituent parts and instrumental preconditions.  The section on Aristotle’s philosophy of science will then provide a broad overview of such themes as the theory of demonstration, the problem of first principles, as well as Aristotle’s account of scientific inquiry and definition. Special attention will be paid to the account developed in Posterior Analytics.

Section §I. Demonstration, Deliberation, and Particularism.
This section will explore whether or not Aristotle’s philosophy of science can help shed light on the nature of deliberation and practical wisdom.

Chapter Three			Topic: Moral Particularism.			9,000
Author: Daniel Devereux
Synopsis: This chapter will present arguments broadly critical of the idea that Aristotle’s philosophy of science can provide the machinery for practical decision making. Devereux will focus on moral particularism, which argues that particular perceptual judgements are the foundation for decisions about virtue, which neither need nor allow for any further defense by appeals to universal principles. From this perspective, Aristotle’s theory of demonstration offers a poor model for understanding his theory of practical deliberation.

Chapter Four			Topic: Practical and Theoretical Knowledge	9,000
Author: David Charles (Oxford University)
Synopsis: Charles will contribute a paper exploring the relationship between practical and theoretical knowledge, as outlined in Nicomachean Ethics/Eudemian Ethics VI (V).

Chapter Five			“Aristotle on principles in ethics”		9,000
Author: Karen Nielsen (University of Western Ontario)
Synopsis: Nielsen examines the question of whether or not ethics has first principles (a hallmark of scientific domains) and, if so, how are they grasped. Aristotle treats ethics as part of political science. The aim of political science is to create well-ordered and happy societies. The ethicist defines the nature of this target – happiness – as well as its instrumental and constituent means. Nielsen examines Aristotle’s parallels between ethics and medicine and other stochastic sciences, arguing that action-guiding rules play a central role in directing the practitioner toward the right acts. Though Aristotle insists that rules of conduct are defeasible (they hold for the most part), they form part of a science of ethics. The prudent person cannot rely exclusively on discernment of ethically salient particulars; like a skilled physician, she must know the nature of her end and master the relevant action-guiding rules. Examining Aristotle’s remarks about universal law and equity in the Nicomachean Ethics V can also help shed light on the relationship between universal and particular in ethics. 

Chapter Six 		“Practical and theoretical knowledge in Aristotle”	7,500
Author: James Allen (University of Pittsburgh)
Synopsis. Allen argues that, despite the emphasis Aristotle places on the differences between scientific knowledge and practical reason, there are two important affinities between them that often go unnoticed. First, there are parallels between the cognitive states themselves: “There is something in the practical sphere that corresponds to knowledge or understanding [epistêmê] in the theoretical realm and which would seem to merit the name ‘knowledge’ even if Aristotle chooses to withhold this designation from it.” For example, in both cases having knowledge involves grasping ‘the because’ (dihoti) rather than simply ‘the that’ (hoti). Second, there is something in the practical realm that corresponds to demonstration, namely, deliberation: “Deliberation occupies the place in the practical sphere occupied by invention in the theoretical. Both are forms of inquiry. Each terminates in the discovery and grasp of a syllogism, a demonstration in the case of theoretical inquiry, a so-called practical syllogism in that of practical inquiry, the grasp of which is knowledge or a condition like it.” Given these strong affinities, Allen argues that both the Prior and Posterior Analytics can help shed light on the nature of deliberation and its result, practical wisdom.

Section §III. Methodology
This section will explore the connections between the methodology of Aristotle’s science and ethics.

Chapter Seven			“Endoxa in the Nicomachean Ethics”		7,500
Author: Joe Karbowski (Notre Dame)
Synopsis: The aim of this paper is to explore the role that reputable beliefs (endoxa) play in the inquiry into the human good (or eudaimonia) in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. The paper begins by examining two different uses of reputable beliefs. In a dialectical context Aristotle employs reputable beliefs directly as the data that guide and constrain inquiry. In a scientific context they function, not as data, but as a means of exposing other claims that serve as data. The latter use is illustrated by the examination of bee reproduction in Generation of Animals III. The endoxa surrounding the generation of bees function, not as appearances to be saved, but as a means of testing different empirical hypotheses established on the basis of induction. In this context it is the empirical facts, not the endoxa, that serve as the immediate data for inquiry. This distinction has important implications for understanding the methodology of NE Book I. According to Karbowski, a detailed analysis of NE I.4-6 shows that Aristotle does not employ reputable beliefs about eudaimonia in a dialectical way; rather, he critically examines the endoxa in order to make salient other facts that function as the data for inquiry. The use of endoxa in NE I shows that Aristotle is not employing the dialectical method, as traditionally assumed. Instead, inquiry into eudaimonia is more scientific in nature. For the way in which Aristotle employs reputable beliefs about eudaimonia follows closely their use in the more scientific treatises.

Chapter Eight			Topic: Inquiry and Definition			9,000
Author: Carlo Natali (Venice)
Synopsis. In NE I 4 Aristotle takes pains to remind us of the difference between arguments from first principles and those on the way to first principles. In the case of ethics, the way to first principles consists (in part) in the search for definitions of key moral concepts (e.g. happiness, virtue, justice). For example, NE II is an inquiry into the what-it-is (ti estin) of virtue (II 5, 1105b19) aimed at defining its “nature” (phusis, 1106a25), “being” (ousia), and “essence” (to ti ên einai, 1107a6-7), which will identify the cause that explains why the virtuous person consistently aims at and hits the mean in actions and passions. Again, Aristotle begins the inquiry into justice and injustice in NE V by saying that “we must define” (dioristeon) the just and the unjust (1130b22), which he undertakes to do over the first few chapters. This paper will explore the method Aristotle uses in the Ethics to establish such definitions and ask: To what extent does the “way to first principles” in the ethical treatises follow the methodical procedures developed in the scientific works for arriving at proper scientific definitions?

Chapter Nine			Topic: For-the-most-part claims			9,000
Author: Devin Henry (The University of Western Ontario)
Synopsis: In several places Aristotle insists that moral phenomena are among the things that are capable of being otherwise so that statements about them hold only “for the most part”. The same holds for natural phenomena, which does not prevent them from being investigated scientifically. At the same time, the Analytics claims that scientific knowledge (epistêmê) is limited to what is universal, necessary, and incapable of being otherwise (e.g. APo. I 33). From this perspective it is hard to see how our knowledge of moral or natural phenomena could ever count as epistêmê. To solve this problem one needs to show that the model of science from the Analytics can accommodate things that hold only for the most part. This chapter will explore that possibility by analyzing the use of “for the most part” in the natural sciences and then applying those results to our understanding of such claims in the ethics and politics.

Chapter Ten	     “Happy Souls: Physics, Forms, and Human Flourishing”	
Author: Christopher Shields (Oxford)
Synopsis: In NE I.13 Aristotle tells us that if the student of politics is to investigate the nature of happiness he must study the soul, which is the subject of the De anima. Up to what point should the student of politics know about the soul? What light is shed on the Ethics by the theory of soul from the De anima?


Section §IV. Ethics and the Natural Sciences
Aristotle tells us that moral phenomena are variable, capable of being otherwise, and that truths about them hold only for the most part; moreover, they are said to be imprecise. Yet, each of these features also characterizes natural phenomena, which makes the analogy with natural science especially relevant to the central question of the volume. Each of the papers in this section will explore the application of concepts, methods, and principles developed for the natural sciences to the study of moral and political phenomena. One branch of natural science that is particularly applicable here (which is the focus of several papers in this section) is biology. For many commentators have noted significant biological aspects to Aristotle’s ethical and political treatises. What can the study of humans qua living things contribute to the study of them qua deliberate moral agents?


Chapter Eleven		Topic: Moral Luck					7,500
Author: Monte Johnson (UC San Diego)
Synopsis: Johnson will contribute a paper that explores the relation between Aristotle’s concepts of luck and chance in Physics II and Aristotle’s account of moral luck in the Ethics.


Chapter Twelve	Topic: Survey of relation between ethics and biology	7,500
Author: Mariska Leunissen (Washington University in St. Louis)
Synopsis: Many commentators have noted several biological aspects to Aristotle’s ethical and political treatises. This paper will explore those connections by examining two separate, but related, sets of questions. First, to what extent do the ethical and political treatises draw from the account of human nature developed in the biological works? Did Aristotle conceive of the moral and biological dimensions of humans as distinct, or is there a continuity between humans qua moral beings and humans qua biological beings? Aristotle’s remarks in the biological works suggest continuity. For example, several qualities that the Ethics treats as necessary building blocks for human happiness are said to be shared in common with non-human animals, including certain character traits (e.g. courage and timidity), cognitive capacities (e.g. cleverness and practical wisdom), and social attributes (e.g. friendship and a “political” way of life). But what, if anything, does Aristotle’s biology remarks about these qualities contribute to the study of human morality? Second, to what extent do the ethical and political treatises make use of the concepts, methods, and principles developed in the biological works? For instance, the function argument in NE I.7 bears a striking resemblances to the reasoning in PA I.5 concerning whole bodies and their functions; but is the concept of “function” being used in the same way? The same holds for the doctrine of the mean developed in NE II, which occurs in the biological works in the context of the actions of nature in producing animals; but how (if at all) are the two concepts of the mean related? Again, what is the status of the arguments building on what is “by nature” in the ethical treatises: are these mere endoxa or does Aristotle use natural principles in his ethical treatises?

Chapter Thirteen		“The Biological Roots of Virtue”		7,500
Author: James Lennox (Pittsburgh)
Synopsis: In this paper Lennox explores the idea that, for Aristotle, the human virtues find their biological roots in what he (Aristotle) calls “natural virtues”. While virtues are states of character rather than natural capacities, Aristotle argues that human beings are naturally suited to receive them. It is this natural suitability that allows him to treat the virtues of character as being based on natural virtue (NE VI 13). Lennox shows how an understanding of the way that virtues of character develop from such natural capacities benefits from an examination of Aristotle’s zoological account of character, especially Historia Animalium VII-VIII (which Lennox calls a “natural history of the virtues”). This chapter would reprint Lennox’s 1999 article from Biology and the Foundations of Ethics (CUP), edited by Jane Maienschein and Michael Ruse, though we would offer Lennox the opportunity to revise the paper.

Chapter Fourteen	“The Good of Humans and of Other Species”		9,000
Author: Georgios Anagnostopoulos (UC San Diego)
Synopsis: In both of his major ethical treatises (EN and EE), Aristotle’s most basic aim is to articulate the good of the human species.  After preliminary discussions in both treatises, he relies on what he takes to be the function of the human species in order to articulate its good and its excellences.  Thus, Aristotle’s account of the good of the human species rests on his scientific/philosophical views about human biology and psychology.  The Aristotelian approach to ethical inquiry appears to leave open the possibility that analogous kinds of inquiry are possible in connection with non-human species.  Indeed, we find that Aristotle throughout his ethical treatises speaks of the goods of other species, as he also does throughout his biological works.  The inquiries into the goods of non-human species are considered to be components of scientific investigation.  In this essay, I plan to investigate Aristotle’s views on the goods of non-human species and what they imply about the character of his ethical inquiries into the good of the humans.

Chapter Fifteen			Topic: The Doctrine of the Mean		7,500
Author: Mary Louise Gill (Brown University)
Synopsis: This paper will explore the underpinnings of Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean in the Ethics and its relation to the theoretical sciences. Particular attention will be paid to the concept of “the more and less”, which plays a central in Aristotle’s zoological works.


Chapter Sixteen		“Ethics, Art, and Science in Aristotle”		7,500
Author: Charlotte Witt (New Hampshire)
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